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Size, Liquidity, and the Cost of Equity
William L. Beedles
The inverse association of capitalization and performance is found to hold over 
a broader range of firms than has been previously studied. This result is found 
by merging data for listed United States firms with data for listed Australian 
companies, which are on average much smaller than their North American 
brethren. For the entire size spectrum and across listing locations, liquidity is 
found to be related to performance, adding support to the popular belief that 
it is (perhaps one of) the factor(s) missing from conventional tests of asset pricing. 
The results suggest that a lack of liquidity, rather than size per se, is a material 
contributor to the high cost of equity finance experienced by small companies. 
Some commentators attach much currency to proposals to subsidize small firms 
by enhancing the liquidity of their shares; the results reported here suggest that 
such subsidies may be effective.
INTRODUCTION
Political economists spent much of the 1980s trying to foster “economic 
development” by increasing the general level of investment. Some 
encouragement has come from direct subsidies, often in the form of venture 
capitalists organized under the auspices of state governments. A variety of 
indirect subsidy that might produce investment at levels beyond those deemed 
appropriate by usual marketplace discipline involves intervening in the 
microstructure of the capital market. For example, Emshwiller [6] has 
described ideas to reduce the trading illiquidity of small companies. The 
thinking seems to be that greater liquidity will reduce investors’ required 
return from small companies. The firms’ capital costs will hence go down, 
and so their levels of investment will go up, or so the logic goes. Little 
evidence exists as to whether such actions might be effective (the focus of 
this paper), let alone whether they might be cost effective (beyond the focus 
of this paper).
Also during the 1980s, financial economists devoted much energy to 
documentation and explanation of what has come to be called the “small 
firm anomaly.” Small firms have been found to pay substantially more for 
equity capital than their equivalent risk but larger brethren.
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The work reported here looks at two questions. (1) Does the well-known 
size effect, where capitalization and two-moment performance are found to 
be inversely related, obtain for enterprises smaller than those investigated 
by most students of the issue? (2) Does trading liquidity serve as a possible 
explanation of the size phenomenon for these smaller firms? Empirical 
evidence is provided indicating that the answers are a firm “y^s” to the first 
and “probably” to the second.
Addressing these matters involved merging information about U.S. 
companies provided by the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP) with similar information on Australian shares 
maintained by the Center for Research in Finance (CRIF) at the Australian 
Graduate School of Management, University of New South Wales (Sydney).
We find that when attention is restricted to New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) securities, a weak size effect is evident that is consistent with a 
liquidity explanation. When shares listed on the American Exchange 
(AMEX) are examined, the size effect is stronger, and the liquidity argument 
is supported more clearly. For the smallest firms—those traded in Australia— 
the size/liquidity effect observed on the AMEX is confirmed. This paper 
concludes with a commentary.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The Size Effect—Updated
Banz [3] and Reinganum [11] were two of the pioneers of size effect 
research. Since Reinganum dealt with “small” AMEX firms, the first step 
here was to conduct an updated (he covered 1963 to 1977) replication of his 
work. Using NYSE and AMEX data from CRSP, a firm was categorized into 
one of 20 portfolios depending upon its equity market value at the end of 
December 1973. ^  If a firm’s value was among the 6% of the smallest, its 1974 
returns were included in portfolio one; if its December 1973 size fell within 
percentiles six to ten, its 1974 returns were included in portfolio two; ... ; 
if it was in the largest 5%, its returns were put in portfolio 20. All listed firms 
were reclassified on the basis of December 1974 value and 1975 returns 
retained in the same way. The process continued until classification was 
based on December 1986 value. After employing this procedure for every 
security, the result is a return matrix with 20 rows, the first of which simulates 
the experience of an investor who specialized in the 5% of all NYSE and 
AMEX stocks that were smallest, the last row representing a mutual fund 
of the largest capitalization firms, with portfolio revision occurring yearly.
As reported in Table 1, the average size of the firms included in the 
smallest portfolio (computed simply as the mean size struck over the 168 study
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Table 1 
Update of Reinganum 
Performance of 20 Market Value Portfolios Composed of NYSE and AMEX 











Smallest 7.01 1.73 1.33 0.70 1.94# 95.8
2 8.15 1.08 1.25 0.10 0.44 91.4
3 12.12 0.89 1.18 -0.03 -0.14 87.5
4 18.60 0.96 1.16 0.05 0.33 81.6
5 24.59 0.97 1.13 0.09 0.66 71.8
6 32.87 0.76 1.08 -0.08 -0.73 59.0
7 41.62 0.97 1.08 0.13 1.25 49.9
8 52.55 0.95 1.06 0.13 1.40 40.9
9 69.21 0.78 1.07 -0.05 -0.56 30.8
10 84.99 0.71 1.07 -0.12 -1.36 27.4
11 108.22 0.66 1.01 -0.12 -1.41 20.5
12 144.63 0.81 0.97 0.06 0.64 16.7
13 208.14 0.70 0.96 -0.05 -0.51 14.4
14 251.47 0.72 0.91 0.01 0.08 10.7
15 342.92 0.65 0.88 -0.03 -0.31 7.4
16 463.25 0.56 0.86 -0.10 -0.73 6.7
17 660.28 0.57 0.84 -0.08 -0.60 4.7
18 987.53 0.51 0.79 -0.11 -0.67 3.4
19 1594.14 0.44 0.72 -0.13 -0.73 2.1
Largest 5509.55 0.19 0.65 -0.32 -1.46 3.4
AVERAGE 531.09 0.78 1.00 0.00 -0.12 36.3
Notes: * Exceeds .05 significance criterion of 1.960.
# Exceeds .10 significance criterion of 1.645.
“ Millions of U.S. dollars. Computedasaverageofend-of-month portfolio value over 168 months, 
January 1974 to December 1987.
 ^ Continuously compounded. Stated in excess of the monthly return on 90-day U.S. Treasury 
securities.
Estimates of the market model, equation (1). Portfolio and index returns are in excess of returns 
on U.S. Treasury instruments.
Percentage of returns computed using prices from American Stock Exchange quotes, averaged 
across 168 months.
months, January 1974 to December 1987) was $7 million. The largest was 
over $5 billion.
On a “raw” basis, the size effect is observed. The correlation of market 
value and return is —.60, virtually identical to Reinganum’s finding. The 
small firm effect is also in evidence. The portfolio of the smallest firms is
the only one with a return more than twice the cross sectional standard 
deviation relative to the cross sectional mean.
To judge performance on a risk-adjusted basis, the market model, stated 
in excess return form using continuously compounded returns, was 
estimated:
R p t R f t  dp hpiR m t -^/t) (^)
where Rt denotes continuous return during month t{= , 168); p, f, and 
m  denote portfolio (= 1, ... , 20), riskfree, and index, respectively; a and b 
are estimated parameters; and e is a residual term assumed to satisfy standard 
assumptions.
Risk adjustment turns out to be appropriate. The high-retum small firm 
portfolios had the largest slopes, i.e., largest OLS estimated betas, i.e., the 
highest estimated systematic risks. Thus the intercept—Jensen’s [8] index— 
is a useful performance measure.
This risk adjustment does not negate the size effect. The correlation of 
size and the intercept is —.48, although much of this is caused by the negative 
performance of the large firm portfolios. The small firm effect also seems 
to hold. Note that the portfolio of smallest firms provided abnormal returns 
that were noteworthy at a comparatively high level of statistical significance 
and that were almost certainly economically material (8.7% per year).
The data of Table 1 also serve to confirm an “exchange effect” The 
correlation between size and the proportion of the portfolio made up of 
AMEX companies is a highly significant —.41. In other words, we cannot 
tell from Table 1 whether a size effect is at work, or if we are observing some 
sort of exchange effect.
In an attempt to unravel the size and exchange effects, the next step 
involved conducting exactly the same analysis reported above, but on 
exchange-specific stocks. The procedure involved forming portfolios by 
classifying each NYSE and each AMEX stock on the basis of size at the end 
of December 1973, December 1974, December 1975, and so forth. The result 
was two data matrices, one with NYSE firms, one with AMEX, each with 
20 rows for the portfolios and 168 columns for the months. Various parameters 
were estimated, and the resulting data reported in Tables 2 and 3.
First consider the big board (Table 2). The size effect is documented with 
a correlation between market value and risk-adjusted performance (market 
model intercept) of —.68. The half dozen or so portfolios of extreme size had 
the most dramatic performance.
The same patterns existed for AMEX firms (Table 3). Performance and 
size were significandy negatively correlated (—.39), and the portfolio of small­
est firms had a market model intercept substantially larger than the others.
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Table 2
Performance of 20 Market Value Portfolios Composed of NYSE Firms, 
1974-1987, Using Equal-Weighted NYSE—AMEX Index









Smallest 20.84 1.17 1.31 0.15 0.48
2 33.39 0.98 1.15 0.09 0.53
3 43.94 1.20 1.08 0.36 2.76*
4 57.49 0.90 1.07 0.07 0.64
5 75.07 0.84 1.05 0.02 0.19
6 88.60 0.82 1.04 0.02 0.17
7 108.66 0.78 0.99 0.02 0.15
8 135.72 0.78 0.96 0.03 0.36
9 172.17 0.67 0.96 -0.08 -0.75
10 228.78 0.77 0.92 0.06 0.54
11 251.39 0.75 0.89 0.07 0.63
12 318.85 0.57 0.89 -0.12 -1.00
13 392.15 0.72 0.86 0.06 0.42
14 489.98 0.56 0.85 -0.11 -0.72
15 622.99 0.54 0.83 -0.11 -0.70
16 814.86 0.55 0.81 -0.08 -0.51
17 1048.67 0.47 0.76 -0.12 -0.67
18 1428.60 0.43 0.74 -0.15 -0.84
19 9991.22 0.34 0.69 -0.19 -0.96
Largest 7164.22 0.14 0.62 -0.34 -1.43
AVERAGE 785.88 0.70 0.92 -0.02 -0.04
Notes: * Exceeds .05 significance criterion of 1.960.
# Exceeds .10 significance criterion of 1.645.
" Millions of U.S. dollars. Computed as average of end-of-month portfolio value over 168 months,
 
January 1974 to December 1987.
* Continuously compounded. Stated in excess of the monthly return on 90-day U.S. Treasury 
securities.
 ^ Estimates of the market model, equation (1). Portfolio and index returns are in excess of returns 
on U.S. Treasury instruments.
Of special interest is a comparison of the results for NYSE and AMEX 
shares, i.e., a comparison of the magnitudes of the data reported in Tables 
2 and 3. While a size effect existed for both, the performance of the smallest 
AMEX firms was much more dramatic than for the NYSE firms—12.4% on 
an annualized basis, versus 4.4% for the third NYSE portfolio. Similarly, the 
AMEX portfolios were all substantially smaller in market value terms than 
their NYSE parallels. Indeed, the median AMEX portfolio would have been 
in the smallest 10% of NYSE firms.
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Table 3
Performance of 20 Market Value Portfolios Composed of AMEX Firms, 









Smallest 3.26 2.04 1.37 0.98 1.98*
2 4.15 1.24 1.32 0.22 0.54
3 5.82 1.20 1.26 0.22 0.71
4 7.21 0.84 1.23 -0.11 -0.41
5 9.19 1.34 1.24 0.38 1.57
6 10.60 0.77 1.15 -0.13 -0.60
7 12.30 0.95 1.17 0.05 0.24
8 14.43 0.80 1.09 -0.05 -0.26
9 17.52 1.12 1.17 0.21 1.12
10 19.48 0.76 1.12 -0.11 -0.64
11 23.56 1.07 1.11 0.21 1.16
12 26.47 0.62 1.07 -0.21 -1.35
13 30.63 0.60 1.02 -0.20 -1.18
14 37.45 0.72 1.05 -0.09 -0.58
15 43.85 0.68 1.04 -0.12 -0.81
16 53.51 0.48 1.03 -0.32 -1.88
17 68.68 0.32 1.08 -0.52 -3.11*
18 98.36 0.65 1.05 -0.16 -0.86
19 174.56 0.54 1.02 -0.25 -1.17
Largest 804.19 0.30 0.94 -0.43 -1.83#
AVERAGE 73.26 0.85 1.13 -0.02 -0.37
Notes: * Exceeds .05 significance criterion of 1.960.
# Exceeds .10 significance criterion of 1.645.
Millions of U.S. dollars. Computed as average of end-of-month portfolio value over 168 months, 
January 1974 to December 1987.
 ^ Continuously compounded. Stated in excess of the monthly return on 90-day U.S. Treasury 
securities.
 ^ Estimates of the market model, equation (1). Portfolio and index returns are in excess of returns 
on U.S. Treasury instruments.
The data of Tables 1-3 support these generalizations:
•  The size effect has been pervasive, being in evidence for die 
combination of NYSE and AMEX firms studied by Reinganum as 
well as NYSE and AMEX firms studied separately here. The 
phenomenon has been found here for a sample period mostly outside 
of Reinganum’s.
•  Much of the size effect has been due to a small firm effect. The most 
dramatic above-average performance has come from the smallest 
firms, v^hich for the most part have been AMEX companies.
•  By many standards, the smallest of CRSP firms—AMEX portfolio 
number one—are large on an absolute basis, with an average market 
value of over $3 million during 1974 to 1987.
To summarize, this subsection has been designed to confirm the size/ 
small firm anomaly found by Reinganum, but over a sample period different 
from his. The intent also has been to extend previous work so as to investigate 
the effects separately for AMEX firms. During 1974 to 1987, the smallest 5% 
of AMEX firms paid about 12% more per annum for equity finance than 
did the typical firm.
Size is not thought to be a causal factor in return generation, but is 
instead an instrument for a (set of) factor(s) omitted from the test 
methodology. Liquidity is one of the most promising factors.
The Liquidity Story
Lakonishok and Smidt [9] have provided evidence that shares’ lack of 
liquidity may be (one of) the missing variable(s) in size effect studies. Among 
other important findings, they show that the frequency with which shares 
trade is a useful reflection of their liquidity [9, especially pp. 438-441]. The 
intuition is this: If an investor holds a share that typically trades on five 
days of the (five-trading-day) week, s/he will have comparatively few 
concerns regarding immediacy. If a sale is desired, willing buyers are usually 
available. In contrast, a share that trades typically only two days per week 
may pose greater immediacy problems. As Grossman and Miller [7] point 
out, the more that trades are separated by time, the greater is the risk 
exposure.
To operationalize this notion, the following illiquidity measure is used. 
Consider a portfolio containing 100 shares during January, a month that 
has, say, 22 trading days. If on average 10 shares do not trade on a given 
day, the portfolio’s illiquidity measure would be .1 =  220/2200 =  (10 X 22)/ 
(100 X 22). If during February, a month with 19 trading days, the portfolio 
contains 110 shares, 100 of which trade on a typical day, the illiquidity 
measure would be .0909 =  190/2090 =  (10 X 19)/(110 X 19). For the two- 
month period, the illiquidity would be .0956 =  (220 +  190)/(2200 +  2090). 
The interpretation is that on the typical day during the two-month study 
period, 9.56% of the portfolio’s constituent securities did not trade. This 
statistic has been computed for the NYSE and AMEX portfolios.
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Over the sample period, the typical AMEX stock did not trade on about 
15% of the days the market was open. This is nearly 12 times more illiquidity 
than the typical NYSE share. The smallest AMEX shares traded, on average, 
only about two days out of three.
Table 4
Illiquidity of 20 NYSE Market Value Portfolios and 20 AMEX 

























Note: Illiquidity is defined as the number of days constituent securities did not 
trade divided by the number of days when they were listed. More precisely, 
if month t has Tt trading days, if portfolio p  contains j  =  I, Jt shares, 
and if Mjt denotes the number of days that share j  did not trade during 
the month, the portfolio’s illiquidity measure is simply the summation 
across constituent secruties of all the “non-trading days” divided by the 
summation of the “available for trade” days in month t. The liquidity 
measure of portfolio p  for month t is
Mp, = 2  Mj,/U, X T.)
J=l
For the NYSE portfolios the illiquidity/performance relationship is 
similar to that found for size and performance, with a correlation of +.61. 
The smallest NYSE shares are nearly five times as illiquid as the typical 
NYSE shares. The association between illiquidity and performance for 
AMEX shares is remarkable; the correlation is +.82.
To summarize:
•  When it comes to the conventional size and small firm effects, “most 
of the action” comes from the smallest firms, which for the most 
part are traded on the AMEX.
•  Size itself does not have normative backing as a factor in the pricing 
of assets. But size perhaps serves as an instrument for liquidity, a 
nodon that others have advanced as a factor in the pricing process.
•  Empirically, illiquidity is a powerful correlate with performance, 
especially for those firms with dramatic performance—AMEX 
companies.
•  By many standards “small” AMEX firms are large.
The Australia Story
The results presented thus far serve to support—and extend to the 
AMEX—the size/performance/illiquidity findings of others. An important 
extension would be an “outside of sample” test. Do the associations found 
here apply to a different class of shares? The natural way to address this is 
to look at OTC stocks. Unfortunately, data on NASDAQ shares are not easily 
compared to the NYSE and AMEX information, although some progress 
is being made [10]. Similarly, transactions prices on “pink sheet” shares are 
not commercially available in computer readable form.
Fortunately, data on firms listed in Australia are available. The markets 
there and in the U.S. are essentially the same in terms of microstructure. A 
major difference is that small Australian companies are extremely small by 
U.S. standards.
That extremely small firms are listed in Australia is rooted in historic 
provincialism. Australia's land mass is approximately equal to that of the 
U.S. but with vast stretches of desert. The country’s population is only 16 
million. Therefore, Australia’s citizens are highly concentrated in the arable 
areas, for the most part around the capital cities of its six states. Adelaide, 
Brisbane, Hobart, Melbourne, Perth, and Sydney have historically been the 
centers of regional commerce and trade. A separate stock market has 
developed in each of the cities. (The Melbourne and Sydney exchanges are 
by far the largest.)
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Table 5
Performance of 20 Market Value Portfolios Composed of Australian Firms, 









Smallest 0.81 8.29 0.67 7.77 7.74* 30.69
2 1.67 5.04 0.57 4.60 6.49* 28.80
3 2.18 3.22 0.40 2.90 4.21* 28.84
4 2.24 3.10 0.44 2.76 4.72* 25.30
5 2.82 2.71 0.41 2.39 4.25* 23.85
6 3.61 2.11 0.42 1.78 3.51* 21.39
7 4.44 1.29 0.43 0.96 2.01* 21.86
8 5.35 1.93 0.38 1.64 3.52* 21.76
9 6.55 1.10 0.45 0.75 1.67# 19.88
10 7.94 0.99 0.42 0.66 1.51 19.80
11 9.87 1.28 0.46 0.92 2.19* 19.31
12 12.26 1.11 0.37 0.82 2.17* 17.88
13 15.10 1.14 o;39 0.84 2.50* 16.61
14 18.49 0.74 0.42 0.41 1.10 14.96
15 24.18 1.18 0.38 0.89 2.56* 14.61
16 33.33 0.88 0.46 0.53 1.40 13.30
17 50.25 0.93 0.54 0.51 1.26 9.79
18 78.83 0.85 0.48 0.47 1.25 7.80
19 154.11 0.90 0.58 0.45 1.03 3.69
Largest 638.73 0.59 0.70 0.04 0.09 3.83
AVERAGE 53.64 1.97 0.47 1.61 2.76 18.20
Notes:  ^ Exceeds .05 significance criterion of 1.960.
# Exceeds .10 significance criterion of 1.645.
 ^ Millions of U.S. dollars. Computed as average of end-of-month portfolio value over 168 months, 
January 1974 to December 1987, using monthly exchange rates.
Continuously compounded. Stated in excess of the monthly return on 90-day U.S. Treasury 
securities.
Estimates of the market model, equation (1). Portfolio and index returns are in excess of returns 
on U.S. Treasury instruments.
Number of days constituent securities did not trade divided by number of days they were listed, 
cf. fn. [a]. Table 5.
Until the advent of reliable real time data transmission, the six 
exchanges had little interaction. Thus, as elsewhere in the world, equity 
needs of the smallest of firms have been met by existing owners through 
retentions and direct investment. When external equity has been desired, 
owners have had available a small, regional stock exchange. As a result, firms
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Table 6
Performance of 20 Market Value Portfolios Composed of Australian Firms, 
1974-1987, Using Equal-Weighted Australian Index
Portfolio Slope" Pet intercept" t(af
Smallest 1.55 5.18 6.45*
2 1.29 2.45 4.87*
3 1.25 0.71 1.55
4 1.14 0.82 2.24*
5 1.09 0.52 1.49
6 1.03 0.04 0.12
7 1.03 -0.78 -3.10*
8 0.98 -0.03 -0.12
9 0.98 -0.85 -3.32*
10 0.96 -0.93 -3.94*
11 0.97 -0.67 -3.26*
12 0.83 -0.56 -2.82*
13 0.76 -0.38 -1.97*
14 0.87 -1.00 -5.49*
15 0.75 -0.33 -1.61
16 0.86 -0.84 -3.87*
17 0.97 -I.Ol -4.46*
18 0.88 -0.92 -4.22*
19 0.99 -1.09 -3.88*
Largest 1.09 -1.59 -5.13*
AVERAGE 1.01 -0.06 -1.52
Notes: * Exceeds .05 significance criterion of 1.960.
# Exceeds .10 significance criterion of 1.645.
“ Estimates of the market model, equation (1). Using portfolio and index returns in excess of 
returns on U.S. Treasury instruments.
have gone (and still go) from private ownership to listing, without the 
“intermediate” step of OTC trading witnessed in the U.S.
With the advent of effective communication, the six regional markets 
are now computer-linked and operate in concert in real time. The Australian 
share market today is akin to the oft-discussed “national” exchange in the 
United States.
CRIF maintains monthly size, return and other data on transactions 
executed at all ,six locations, beginning in 1973. (This explains why the 
analysis of U.S. firms was started at that time, rather than using all 
information available from CRSP.) These data are compatible with the 
CRSP information, except with respect to the illiquidity measure. Daily data 
are not available from CRIF. However, the date of the last monthly trade
is provided for each share. With this datum, an illiquidity measure can be 
estimated that is an exact parallel to the one developed for U.S. firms.
If an Australian share changes hands on the last trading day of the 
month, the presumption is made that it traded every day, i.e., its illiquidity 
is set to 0.0. If it traded on the next to last day, but not on the last day, the 
pattern of its trading on half the days was presumed to hold throughout the 
month, i.e., its illiquidity is set to .5. If the last trade occurred three days 
from month end (that is, no trades occurred during the last two trading days), 
the share was assumed to trade just one of three days for the entire month, 
so illiquidity is set at .67; illiquidity is set to .75 if three days were missed; 
and so forth. ^  Table 5 has the data for the Australian firms.
In terms of average size and illiquidity, Australia is similar to the AMEX: 
$53 million versus $73 million; 18% missing trading versus 15%. However, 
the smallest Australian companies are about a fourth the size of the smallest 
AMEX firms, $810 thousand versus $3.26 million. The performance of the 
smallest Australian firms is dramatically greater than the smallest AMEX: 
7.77% per month versus .98%.
This striking performance of the smallest Australian shares is in keeping 
with the findings of Brown, Keim, Kleidon, and Marsh [5] and Beedles, Dodd, 
and Officer [4].^  However, interpreting the Australian performance in the 
present context is difficult because the Australian portfolios are not highly 
correlated with the U.S. index. Table 6 contains Australian performance 
statistics when an Australian index is used.
These data support three generalizations.
•  The size effect exists in Australia. The correlation of value and 
performance using a U.S. (Australian) index is —.29 (—.32).
•  The small firm effect is dramatic. Australian enterprises with a 
market value of less than one million dollars (U.S.) paid perhaps 
60% more per year for equity than the standard mean and variance- 
based testing regime would lead us to expect.
•  Illiquidity is highly collinear with the small firm/size effects. The 
most illiquid portfolio is the smallest. The correlation of illiquidity 
and performance using a U.S. (Australian) index is .90 (.87).
CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTARY
The lack of ambiguity in the results reported here is surprising; the size/ 
performance/liquidity relationship comes through clearly even in the face 
of several potentially onerous methodological problems. (1) Due to 
Australian data availability, a relatively short time period (14 years) had to
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be studied. (2) A rather crude measure of liquidity—average frequency of 
trading divided by average “availability for trading”—was used. (3) An 
unambiguous specification of the appropriate “market index” is not 
available, so the characterization of the return generating process was not 
as accurate as one would like.
Even with these problems, the size, performance, and liquidity 
associations came through clearly. A final summary in Table 7 thus combines 
data from all three trading locations.
Several conclusions emerge irrespective of how the data are arranged. 
The size effect holds over a broader range of company sizes than has been 
studied before in an integrative fashion. Investors in high performing small 
firms are exposed to greater liquidity risks than are investors in large firms, 
adding further support to liquidity’s being (one of) the missing factor(s) 
in studies of asset pricing. Importantly for present purposes, from a 
manager’s standpoint a clear incentive exists to see that the firm’s investors 
face as little market illiquidity as is cost effective [1; 2]. Operationally, this 
suggests that encouraging broker/dealers to “make a market” in your 
shares may be a worthwhile undertaking. From the standpoint of public 
policy, considerable debate and discussion currently centers on methods 
for governmental bodies to intervene in the marketplace to affect the cost 
of financing for small firms. Some units of government have provided 
subsidies under the auspice of “economic development,” e.g., venture 
capital funds that are not subject to the typical discipline of the 
marketplace.
Another method is to intervene in the structure of the market [6]. The 
notion seems to be to the effect that enhancing the liquidity of investments 
will make them more attractive, and thereby make the raising of funds easier 
and less costly for inherently illiquid, i.e., small, firms. The results here 
suggest that such intervention can be effective. The evidence indicates that 
illiquidity is closely associated with the cost of equity capital, especially for 
extremely small firms.
The previous paragraph is dramatically different than an advocacy 
position for such market intervention. While effective, whether such 
intervention is an efficient use of the resources of a governmental body is 
beyond the purview  of th is—and perhaps any o ther—scientific 
investigation. Judgments regarding such intervention are best left to 
political economists rather than financial economists. However, the results 
presented here are more powerful than any to have gone before regarding 
documentation of the potential effectiveness of programs to affect market 
illiquidity.
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NOTES
1. Reinganum [11] used deciles. Since the most dramatic abnormal returns are displayed 
by the smallest firms—see [11], Table 8—the small firm effect can be seen more clearly 
with more groups, hence the use of 20 here.
2. Of course, a share might only trade once during the entire month, in which case it should 
have an illiquidity measure of about .95 =  19/20. If that single Urade occurred on the 
last day of the month, estimated illiquidity would be 0.0. However, no evidence of 
systematic intra-month trading variation exists in Australia across firms of various sizes, 
so no reason exists to expect that a bias is introduced to the illiquidity measure.
3. “Striking” may be an understatement; the average annual return on the smallest decile 
of Australian firms was over 100%.
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